This first article of a two-part series examines the different perspectives of both sides of the conflict in Ukraine, and how NATO’s charter may have hamstrung the alliance.
The war in Ukraine evokes a deep sadness, a sense of injustice, and a warning for Australia.
It brings to mind a conversation I had with a senior member of our ADF last year, who in discussion about Australia’s threat environment was asked for thoughts on whether Australia was in competition or conflict with its potential adversaries.
The response was quick, concise and clear: “It doesn’t matter what we think; what do they think?”
The point was that our perspective matters little unless it is shared.
We are at a disadvantage if we assess the situation as competitive, only to find our opponent considers it one of conflict.
I’m reminded of this in the Ukrainian context, albeit with a different question: are both sides playing by the rules, or ignoring them completely?
It is first important to understand the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in this question.
NATO was established in 1949 after WWII and has 30 member states.
Its primary objective in relation to defence is that an attack on one member state is an attack on all, and the NATO alliance will respond accordingly.
This is defined in Article 5.
Australia is a partner country to NATO, not a member.
Ukraine seeks to be a member but is not currently a member.
While Russia is a nuclear power, it is understandable that NATO remains concerned about being drawn into a conflict of potentially devastating escalation.
This also assumes, however, that supplying weapons and implementing widespread sanctions is seen by Russian president, Vladimir Putin, as simply playing by the rules and not in itself an escalation of conflict.
It further assumes that international laws and conventions are being followed and acknowledged by all parties.
Failure to recognise the difference in perspectives, rules versus no rules, competition versus conflict, creates strategic and actual weakness.
While NATO believes it avoids escalation by playing within a rule book, President Putin publicly calls the supply line from NATO to Ukraine an escalation, and Russia continues to escalate.
What the Ukrainians desperately need is closed airspace, actual military support, and at the time of writing (mid-March) this has not been provided.
What will trigger military action from NATO? Troops amassing on the Ukrainian border? Breaching sovereignty? Bombing civilian areas? Killing civilians? Ignoring a humanitarian ceasefire? Shooting near a nuclear facility? Using thermobaric weapons? Bombing a children’s hospital? Rumoured use of white phosphorus bombs in civilian areas?
It seems only Article 5 will compel action.
It’s an impossible tragedy.
Intervene and risk nuclear escalation, don’t intervene and watch an innocent and sovereign nation suffer because it wanted to be your ally.
Ominously, the assumption that Ukraine is the only objective ignores the incremental steps taken by Russia in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014).
There is a moral aspect to NATO’s lack of response that sits uncomfortably with me.
When my seven-year-old child asked what was being discussed, my simple description highlighted the moral issue at stake here.
NATO and Ukraine sought to be friends, Ukraine got beaten up by a bully because of the possible friendship, and NATO stood aside and watched while calling the bully names.
In any playground I’ve been on as a child, we’d consider the bully a bad person, but also wonder why NATO stood on the sidelines.
While NATO’s restraint has complex and understandable reasoning to an extent, the concern is what this means for NATO, for the EU and for international alliances.
Morality appears not to motivate military action.
Expressed desires for future collaborations are insufficient.
War crimes do not move military capability to enforce moral codes.
Short of direct military intervention, NATO has moved quickly, as has the EU, to do what it can.
Increasing defence budgets, approving member applications, implementing crippling sanctions.
For those on the ground in Ukraine, I’m certain it didn’t feel fast enough or sufficiently impactful.
The risk is that this damages the perception of NATO and other international alliances, supposedly one of President Putin’s objectives.
My attention then turns to how this affects Australia.
In the next column, I’ll explore what Australia has done in response to the war in Ukraine; what is or should be in place to compel allied nations to support Australia if under attack; and what it all means for Australian industry.
• Kristian Constantinides is the general manager of Airflite, and chairperson of AIDN-WA; the opinions expressed are purely his own
