Spy ship saga exposes vulnerability

On Friday May 13, Australia’s defence minister at the time, Peter Dutton, announced that a Chinese intelligence ship was located off the Western Australian coast.

The ship was a type 815 of the Dongdiao II class, an electronic surveillance ship.

Named Haiwangxing, it was travelling in international waters but also inside Australia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Part of the controversy relates to the potential mission of the Chinese spy ship.

It was remarkably close to the Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station, near Exmouth.

This Australian and US station provides communications to Australian, US and allied vessels.

An unannounced spy ship near a significant communications station undoubtedly raises concerns, as does Mr Dutton’s suspicion that the ship was also conducting hydrographic surveys.

Haiwangxing’s presence in Australian waters, only eight days from a federal election, triggered a number of public comments.

Firstly, Mr Dutton described the visit of the spy ship as an “act of aggression”.

In response, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian called Mr Dutton’s remarks “sensational”, while claiming that “China always abides by international law and international practice”.

Mark McGowan, a former naval legal officer, has subsequently called Mr Dutton a threat to Australia’s national security by virtue of what the WA premier considered to be inflammatory remarks.

The basis of Mr McGowan’s assertion is that it is not unusual for foreign warships to travel through the exclusive economic zones of other nations.

“We do it in the waters off China. The US does it in the waters off China. We do it all over the world because that’s the law of the sea,” Mr McGowan said.

There have also been claims that Mr Dutton’s announcement was unnecessary, and was motivated by the then-upcoming election, whereby the Liberal Party had been making national security one of its key talking points.

As prime minister, Scott Morrison was also drawn into the discussion, and his views represented a middle ground between the aforementioned comments.

“I certainly don’t believe that when you take it together with the many coercive acts and the many statements that have been made attacking Australia’s national interest, you could describe it as an act of bridge-building or friendship,” Mr Morrison said.

There is a lot to address here, and all participants could be deemed correct in their points of view.

I met with Mr Dutton on the day of the press conference, and while the content of those conversations is not for public consumption, I did not get the impression his concerns regarding the ship were politically motivated.

Chinese spokesperson Zhao Lijian and Mr McGowan are correct, China broke no laws, and the voyage of military ships through international waters and EEZs is common.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes freedom of navigation (FON) rights, an evolution over centuries that is designed to allow free movement but also protect the sovereign interests of nations through EEZs, as an example.

China and Australia are parties to this UNCLOS, while the US is not, although it acts to enforce its conditions.

In this way, China and Mr McGowan are right to claim congruence with international law and practice.

It has been asserted in The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law that China views military freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as provocative, although it defends its actions off the WA coastline.

It is also accepted that voyages into EEZs are declared beforehand, not as a matter of law but of courtesy.

China would point to issues with US and Australian naval activities in the past as a counterpoint here.

This is where Mr Morrison’s comments highlighting the context feel most appropriate.

In a scenario where the comments from all parties are justifiable to an extent, a spy ship with no other known purpose, travelling close to an Australian and US communications station, within an EEZ, should at least have come with forewarning.

Without it, everyone is left to assume the intention within a tense context.

It also highlights the need for force posture review, or force projection assessments, in our north-west. With funds committed for growing the Australian Defence Force, it is an ideal time to establish new bases and capabilities in our north-west to aid in that force projection. It remains a point of potential strategic vulnerability that must be addressed.

• Kristian Constantinides is the general manager of Airflite, and chairperson of AIDN-WA; the opinions expressed are purely his own